THE JOHN MARSHALL LAW SCHOOL
CENTER FOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & PRIVACY LAW

HOSTS

THE TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL
JOHN MARSHALL LAW SCHOOL INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION IN
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY LAW

OCTOBER 14-16, 2004


 

 

Requests for Interpretation

Question: The last sentence on page 4 of the record states "The Center was unable to produce either Ramon's signed medical information form or the privacy policy receipt". Are we to assume that the 'medical information form' is actually the 'medical release form' mentioned in the previous sentence?
Answer: Yes.


Question: The first question of the Order Granting Leave to Appeal only grants leave on the question of public disclosure of a private fact. Should the teams also address the issue of scope of employment, which is contained in the appellate court decision in the Record (pages 7 and 9-10)?
Answer: The scope of the appeal is as stated in the Order Granting Leave to Appeal.


Question: If the teams are to address the scope of employment, is there any particular law the teams should follow or look to since the States vary in their views on this issue?
Answer: The State of Marshall is a state within the United States, and is not part of any other state.


Question: On page 14 of the record, the order indicates that: "For ease of reference, Ramon Jacques shall be designated Appellant and the Center, Appellee before this Court." Section 1020.(2) of the competition rules indicates that briefs should conform to the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, except as modified in the rules. The Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States appear to mandate that "Petitioner" and "Respondent" be used instead of some other name. There appears to be a conflict in how the parties should be designated. Would you please resolve this seeming conflict?
Answer: Follow the order of the Supreme Court of the State of Marshall (page 14 of the Record).


Question: Page 7 of the record quotes Marshall Revised Code § 562(B) after stating that Marshall follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The section of the Restatement that contains the identical wording as the Marshall statute is § 652D. Is this a typo or did you intend the statute number and the restatement number to be different?
Answer: This is not a typo. The statute and the corresponding Restatement provision do not have the same number.


Question: Page 3 of the record on appeal states that, "There was no evidence in the trial record that anyone other than Betty or the Daily Whitewater Reporter visited the http://drunkenhusband.com website." Appendix 1 appears to be a printout of the website. That printout of Appendix 1 identifies John Marshall Law School at the top as being the one that printed the website. Does the identification of John Marshall Law School in Appendix 1 conflict with the indication on page 3 that only two people ever saw the website?
Answer: Disregard the caption on the printout in Appendix 1.


Question: On page 6 of the record, the court cites to 210 Marshall Stat. 85/6.17. This statute is not included in the record.
Answer: The relevant portion of that statute appears on page 12 of the Record.


Question: On page 11, 45 C.F.R. 164.512 (e)(1)(ii) is summarized improperly in the sentence preceding the cite. That section permits disclosure under subpoena if the individual is given notice or if the information is subject to protective order. The party seeking the protected information has the choice to notify or seek a protective order. The same standard is stated incorrectly on page 12 as well. For the purposes of brief and oral argument, am I to assume this is a typo, or am I to assume the court of appeals misunderstood the standard? The cases and the code itself are awfully clear so I hesitate to assume the court misunderstood the standard.
Answer: It is not a typo.

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